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ABSTRACT
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) carry out important activities in
many countries, often generating considerable negative impact
regarding the enjoyment of human rights. This paper addresses
issues of attribution of responsibility in international customary law
and international human rights law, considering that international
remedies are one of the possible venues for access to justice in case
national redress fails. The question is whether responsibility only
arises when the State does not comply with its duty of SOEs’ human
rights impact, or whether acts and/or omissions by SOEs may also
be directly attributable to the State. Finally, the paper looks into a
recent proposal that it is necessary to use “piercing the veil” theories
in order to complement theories of state responsibility and evaluates
its usefulness for international human rights law. The article argues,
innovating on this point, that SOEs are the only business entities
which have, as of now, direct responsibilities under international
law lege lata.
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1. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM
The question of this paper arises due to the problem of access to
justice in corporate human rights violations, which is amply
documented.1 For a series of reasons, third party victims—
especially, affected communities—cannot sue foreign (and
sometimes also national) corporations effectively when these
corporations have participated in human rights abuse. The reasons
commonly discussed are the impossibility to access the arbitration
forum where the investment contracts or treaties are adjudicated;2
the lack of recognition or justiciability of certain human rights at the
national level, especially, economic, social and cultural rights;3
general problems of access to justice in the national context, like
corruption, lack of effectiveness, lack of legal aid, or similar issues;4
lack of recognition of extraterritorial jurisdiction in cases when
access to justice in the host state fails;5 and unavailability of funds or
reserves in special purpose vehicles or other host state

1 See generally Jennifer Zerk, Corporate liability for gross human rights abuses:
towards a fairer and more effective system of domestic law remedies, Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), (Feb. 2014),
www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/DomesticLawRemedies/StudyDo
mesticeLawRemedies.pdf [https://perma.cc/WQ36-LU9Z] (investigating the
effectiveness of domestic judicial responses to gross human rights abuses by
corporations); OHCHR, Improving accountability and access to remedy for victims of
business-related human rights abuse, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/32/19 (May 10, 2016),
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/DomesticLawRemedies/
A_HRC_32_19_AEV.pdf [https://perma.cc/M3ME-YHQV] (providing guidance
for the problem of business-related human rights abuses).
2 See generally GLOBAL PROJECT FINANCE, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT (Sheldon Leader & David Ong eds., 2011) (providing an overview of
the barriers to arbitration of investment contracts or treaties in the project finance
sector).
3 See generally SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(Sandra Fredman & Meghan Campbell, eds., 2016) (noting that the adjudication of
conflicts over socio-economic human rights requires innovative solutions to
overcome the obstacles of justiciability at the national level).
4 See La Oroya v. Peru, Admissibility Decision, Inter-Am. Co. H.R. P-1473-06
at ¶68 (2009) (highlighting the ineffectiveness of domestic judicial remedies when
confronting abuses by a state owned metallurgical complex which contaminated La
Oroya, Peru by noting the unavailability of evidence of compliance by the complex
in regards to a grave and urgent judgement against it 3 years earlier).
5 See generally MIRKO MILANOVIC, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS TREATIES 118–259 (2011) (examining the difficulties involved in holding a
state accountable for its obligations under a human rights treaty towards an
individual located outside its jurisdiction).
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incorporations, which make payment of compensation illusory.6 In
international law, no direct human rights obligations of corporations
have been recognized as of yet; the soft law standards that do exist
cannot be enforced.7 This replicates, to a large extent, the problems
of access to justice that exist in domestic law, unless the State can be
made responsible—usually indirectly—for business behavior.
Typical human rights violations will depend on the sector in
which the SOE works. SOEs are usually to be found in the extractive
and energy sectors; in the services sector, especially banking and
passenger transportation; and in telecommunications.8 As has been
documented in case studies, violations in these sectors include,
violations of indigenous land rights,9including eviction or
resettlement without free, prior, and informed consent; violations of
the right to health, the right to water; or the right to live in a healthy
environment in relation to emissions, spills, rupture of tailing
dams,10 or similar environmental damage due to contamination;
See Leader & Ong, supra note 2, at 3–12, 107–142.
See generally Special Representative of the Secretary General, Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect,
Respect and Remedy” Framework, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) endorsed
by A/HRC/Res/17/4 (June 16, 2011) (proposing a set of principles to be followed
by transnational corporations and other business enterprises); Tara Melish & Errol
Meidinger, Protect, Respect, Remedy and Participate: ‘New Governance’ Lessons for the
Ruggie Framework, in THE UN GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
FOUNDATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION 303, 304 (Radu Mares ed., 2012) (critically
appraising the “Protect, Respect, Remedy” framework created by John Gerard
Ruggie). For more on direct accountability, see generally JERZEJ LETNAR & TARA
VAN HO, HUMAN RIGHTS AND BUSINESS: DIRECT CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS (2015) (examining the direct human rights obligations of
international companies); Humberto Cantú, Derechos Humanos y Empresas:
Reflexiones desde América Latina, Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos
(2017),
http://perso.unifr.ch/derechopenal/assets/files/obrasportales/op_20170808_02.
pdf [https://perma.cc/BCB3-2KSP] (discussing the relationship between SOEs and
human rights in various Latin American countries).
8 See Org. for Econ. Cooperation and Dev. [OECD], Guidelines on Corporate
Governance of State-Owned Enterprises, at 11 (Nov. 19, 2015) [hereinafter OECD],
https://www.oecdilibrary.org/docserver/9789264244160en.pdf?expires=1550541
358&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=5EDC010406031160EE634A13E433E4B3
[https://perma.cc/GLC2-XBJT].
9 See Pueblo Indígena Kichwa de Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Preliminary
Exceptions, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C)
245, ¶2 (June
27,
2012),
https://www.escrnet.org/sites/default/files/Court%20Decision%20_English_.p
df [https://perma.cc/SFL6-GB3L] (highlighting threats to indigenous populations
by SOEs in the context of resource extraction).
10 See generally Caio Borges & Tchenna Fernandes Maso, The Collapse of the
River
Doce
Dam,
14
SUR
(2017),
https://sur.conectas.org/wp6
7
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violations of individual and collective labor rights;11 and violations
of the right to life, integrity, freedom of assembly, or freedom of
expression in relation to social protest against business projects.12
Finally, there might be violations of the right to information or the
right to participation in the project planning, design, exploration,
operation, and closure phases. With regard to community and client
relations in the service sector, violations may additionally occur
through discrimination, be it due to race, ethnicity, gender, sexual
orientation, national origin, religion, participation in a trade union,
or socio-economic condition, among other grounds.
In the case of State-owned enterprises (SOEs), there are three
additional problems, which in part aggravate the challenges just
mentioned. They are also a problem in themselves, with regard to
the capacity of a state to avoid responsibility: first, it is not exactly
clear in which cases a SOE’s acts and omissions in matters of human
rights can be attributed to the State directly, and in which cases they
cannot be attributed. As Georgios Petrochilos puts it, arbitrators
“seem to proceed on the basis that if an entity would be an organ in
the experience of those needed to decide the issue, then an organ it
is,”13 which signals, ironically, that jurisprudence is inconsistent.
Second, SOEs might in certain contexts claim state immunity and
make access to justice in international fora illusionary.14 Third, due
content/uploads/2017/06/sur-25-ingles-caio-borges-tchenna-fernandes-maso.pdf
[https://perma.cc/88M6-CDZL] (exploring human rights abuses through the
prism of a mining waste dam collapse in Brazil).
11 See Trabajadores Cesados de Petroperú y otros v. Perú, Preliminary
Exceptions, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C)
No. 344 (Nov. 23, 2017) (holding that Peru violated labor rights of 165 workers of
two ministries and two state-owned enterprises enshrined in article 26 ACHR when
dismissing them between 1996 and 1998, as well as their rights to due process and
access to justice, recognized in articles 8.1 and 25 ACHR).
12 See Pueblo Indígena Kichwa de Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Preliminary
Exceptions, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C)
245, ¶2 (June 27, 2012).
13
Georgios Petrochilos, Attribution of Conduct of Non-State Organ Entities: An
Introduction, in THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 351, 357
(Shaheeza Lalani & Rodrigo Polanco Lazo eds., 2015).
14 See
JULIA PULLEN, DIE IMMUNITÄT VON STAATSUNTERNEHMEN IM
ZIVILRECHTLICHEN ERKENNTNIS- UND VOLLSTRECKUNGSVERFAHREN 276–280 (2012)
(arguing that, if immunity is conceded to state-owned enterprises in civil
procedure, based on the modern function-based theory of immunity, then the
international law exception to immunity in case of gross human rights violations
must also apply). On the internationalization of SOEs, see generally STATE-OWNED
MULTINATIONALS (Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra ed., 2018) (discussing the differences
between SOEs and state-owned multinational enterprises).
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to the fact that many states started high-impact industries like
mining, oil and gas, or energy, through the creation of SOEs in times
when environmental standards were still low or nonexistent,
considerable historic damage was generated by SOEs, with many
contaminated sites waiting for clean-up, or workers dealing with
serious work-related diseases.15 Many of these SOEs have since been
privatized or liquidated. In these situations, the question of state
responsibility is even more pressing. Said more simply, in order to
argue a concrete case, it is a condition sine qua non to identify the
correct hypothesis under which a State is responsible to make a
successful case. Otherwise, the result of the judgment would be
arbitrary and not based on legal considerations.
The question addressed in this paper is, therefore, under which
conditions must acts and omissions of SOEs be attributed to the State
and not remain in the private realm. This question has been
discussed in public international law but not sufficiently in
international human rights law. This justifies going back to the
“antique niceties of law (for public bodies)”16 despite the necessity
to (also) analyze SOEs from a perspective of corporate governance.17
As the latest contribution from a UN body on the topic focused
mostly on governance and omitted questions of international public
law, this article pretends to complement the debate.
Answering this question will enable us to pose (and answer
elsewhere)18 a second question, i.e., in which situations must a State
respond for the human rights violations committed by its SOEs.
Here, I will only argue that attribution under international law is
possible if the State controls the enterprise, or if the latter exercises
governmental or public functions. This does in no case exclude State
responsibility that arises from the lack of regulation, oversight, or
due diligence by state organs, which violates the horizontal
obligations to protect that States have under international human
rights treaties, a point which is not controversial. Overall, this paper
is the first to argue that SOEs have direct responsibilities in
international human rights law, thus converting them into the only

See Borges & Maso, supra note 10.
Larry Catá Backer, The Human Rights Obligations of State-Owned Enterprises
(SOEs): Emerging Conceptual Structures and Principles in National and International
Law and Policy, 51 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 827, 879 (2017).
17 Id.
18
Schönsteiner, Human Rights Obligations of State-Owned Enterprises,
Presentation, Heidelberg (Dec. 1, 2016) and Nürnberg (Feb. 13, 2018).
15
16
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business entities which under international law lege lata have direct
responsibilities.
This paper proceeds as follows: after briefly setting out the
reasons why it matters whether state responsibility arises directly or
indirectly (section 1), different sources are analyzed in order to
determine and systematize criteria for direct19 attribution of state
responsibility (section 2), drawing especially from the ILC Draft
Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts of
2001, and taking into account the OECD Guidelines on Governance
of SOEs, the rules of state immunity, arbitral jurisprudence and
specifically, the jurisprudence of, respectively, the European Court
of Human Rights (ECtHR), of the Inter-American Commission and
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (section 3). In the fourth
and last section, the proposal of an alternative or complementary
argument on piercing the corporate veil between a SOE and the State
is discussed. Starting from Petrochilos’ observation that “one way
to see this case is as one where the corporate veil, which would
normally clothe the [state-owned] company and insulate it from the
State, [is] lifted on account of pervasive influence of the State on its
actions.”20 The argument of piercing the corporate veil allegedly fills
the voids of responsibility that are said to be left out in the law of
international state responsibility (section 4).21 The article will show
that this hypothesis does not hold true for, at least, international
human rights law. Finally, the article concludes with a list of criteria
which allows the determination in human rights cases of whether
there is direct state responsibility for actions and omissions of SOEs.

19
Defined as direct responsibility due to the SOEs acts or omissions, or as
indirect responsibility due to the omissions of regulatory or oversight organs,
respectively; the term is not widely used, but appears in some recent discussions
on international responsibilities regarding non-state actors. See generally Elizabeth
Nielsen, State Responsibility for Terrorist Groups, 17 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L. LAW & POLICY
151 (2010) (examining the range of possible standards of state responsibility for
actions of SOEs in the context of counterterrorism measures); Michael Feit,
Responsibility of the State under International Law for the Breach of Contract Committed
by a State-Owned Entity, 28 BERKELEY J. INT’L. L. 142 (2010) (discussing how
governments can be held directly responsible when SOEs breach contracts with
foreign investors); Antenor Hallo de Wolf, Reconciling Privatization with Human
Rights, SCHOOL OF HUMAN RIGHTS RESEARCH SERIES 49, INTERSENTIA (2012) (studying
the effects of privatizing state functions and services on human rights).
20 See Petrochilos, supra note 13, at 357.
21 See generally ALBERT BADIA, PIERCING THE VEIL OF STATE ENTERPRISES IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2014) (discussing corporate veil-piercing in the
context of international law, particularly investment arbitration cases).
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WHY DOES THE MANNER OF ATTRIBUTION MATTER?

One might think that in the end, it should not matter whether
state responsibility derives from a failure of the State to respect
(through a SOE) or a failure of an oversight organ to protect human
rights against violations from this “private-like” actor. The State
will be responsible anyway in both cases. It seems that the European
Court of Human Rights, and from a different angle, the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights (see sections 3.1 and 3.2) have
worked with these or similar presumptions.
But it is not as easy as that, because the distinction between
direct and indirect obligations, is associated with different degrees of
the duty of care regarding the control by state officials versus nonstate actors: the threshold of preventative duties is more onerous for
state organs themselves than it is for organs tasked with the
oversight of private actors, where usually the (lower) standard of
due diligence, rather than obligations of result, applies. This is due
to reduced assumptions of knowledge of what happens in the
private economic sphere and lower standards of control than for
state organs.22 Additionally, literature is clear on the fact that due
diligence does not apply regarding the State’s duty to refrain from
certain acts where obligations of result prevail.23 If, based on
customary international law criteria, we were able to conclude that
the SOE were a state organ or acted on behalf of the State, certainly
these more onerous obligations would apply to them; and if, to the
contrary, they were considered private actors, such obligations
would not be due under international law. Only indirectly, by

22
For a discussion on the duties of prevention, see generally Pasquale De
Sena, Responsabilité Internationale et Prévention des Violations des Droits de l’homme, in
Emmanuel Décaux, LA PREVENTION DES VIOLATIONS DES DROITS DE L’HOMME (2013);
Sébastien Touzé & Emmauel Décaux, La Notion de Prévention en Droit International
des Droits de l’homme, in Emmanuel Décaux, LA PREVENTION DES VIOLATIONS DES
DRIOTS DE L’ HOMME (2013). Dimitri Xenos, POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS UNDER EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (Routledge eds., 2012); Franz Ebert, & Romina
Sijnienski, Preventing Violations of the Right to Life in the European and the InterAmerican Human Rights Systems: From the Osman Test to a Coherent Doctrine on Risk
Prevention?, 15 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 343 (2015) (arguing that international courts ought
to clarify and further develop the Osman test, which determines whether a state has
the duty to prevent violations of the right to life by non-state actors).
23 See generally Maja Sersic, Due Diligence: Fault-Based Responsibility or
Autonomous Standard?, in CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF BUDISLAV VUKAS 153 (Rudiger Wolfrum eds., 2015) (examining
the historical view that fault is not applicable to international obligation).
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virtue of the State’s duty to protect through its oversight organs,
would a reduced responsibility arise.24
It is generally held that the duties to protect and to guarantee
human rights only apply to state organs;25 the question arises how
these duties would have to be carried out in case the State chose to
provide guarantees of economic or social rights through its SOEs,
for example, in the area of water and sanitation.26 Finally, there
might also be differences between reparation and non-repetition
guarantees awarded by tribunals depending on whether obligations
are direct or indirect. Researching this question empirically,
however, goes beyond the present argument.27
Another problem regarding attribution, discussed in literature
as well, arises through the initial design of SOEs. While it is agreed
in international law that the setting up of an enterprise by a State
does not ipso facto generate state responsibility,28 it will be argued
here that there are certain structural designs of SOEs that per se
impede access to justice, as they might simply have the consequence
of avoiding State liability. In those cases, it would seem that the
24 See, e.g., IACHR, Indigenous Peoples, Communities of African Descent, Extractive
Industries,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.doc.47/15
(2015),
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/extractiveindustries2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H5PN-WKR7] (discussing positive responsibilities of states to
ensure respect for human rights within its jurisdiction under the American
Convention).
25 See, e.g., Ricardo Pisillo Mazzeschi, Responsabilité de l’état pour Violation des
Obligations Positives Relatives aux Droits de l’homme, 333 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE
HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 175 (2008) (systematizing international
and regional human rights jurisprudence regarding State due diligence and
positive obligations to protect and guarantee human rights). For a debate, see
Jonathan Bonnitcha & Robert McCorquodale, The Concept of “Due Diligence” in the
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, 28 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 899, 916
(2017) (arguing that enterprises have duties to protect regarding their supply
chains).
26 See Macarena Contreras & Judith Schönsteiner, Derecho al Agua, Emergencias
y Responsabilidades del Estado y de las Empresas Sanitarias, INFORME ANUAL SOBRE
DERECHOS HUMANOS EN CHILE, EDICIONES UDP 99 (2017) (discussing generally the
capacity of the Chilean State to guarantee the right to safe drinking water in the face
of emergencies, considering that drinking water is provided by private and a stateowned enterprise).
27 See generally Leader & Ong, supra note 4 (discussing non-repetition
guarantees in human rights jurisprudence).
28 See
JONAS
DEREJE,
STAATSNAHE
UNTERNEHMEN.
DIE
ZURECHNUNGSPROBLEMATIK IM INTERNATIONALEN INVESTITIONSRECHT UND WEITEREN
BEREICHEN DES VÖLKERRECHTS 405 (2015) (referring to international jurisprudence on
attribution of acts and omissions of state-owned enterprises to the State, which
indicates that the creation of a state-owned enterprises by itself does not generate
attributability, while the structure defined in its statutes may well do so).
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State has to respond under international human rights law for the
sovereign act of creating a badly designed SOE, if this design results
in human rights violations in the future.
But there are concerns of international relations and
international politics too. As a brief revision of the discussion on
SOEs in the current international investment schemes shows, in
several States with a high state investment volume, like China and
the Nordic or Arab States, it is not always uncontroversial whether
the activities of these “enterprises in state-vicinity”29 are acting with
purely economic purposes or whether they intervene with the
objective of policy-making in their own (home-)states or, in cases of
foreign investment through SOE, state-owned financial institutions
or similar bodies, with the aim of economic diplomacy or
influencing economic policies of the host-state.30 According to
Poulsen, this might lead to difficulties in determining “who the true
complainant [or respondent, the author] actually is”, especially in
“low-transparency environments”.31 In the context of potential
human rights violations committed by SOEs, such complexity and
eventual confusion may constitute an impediment to access to
justice, while according to international human rights law, no
institutional design may have that effect.
More generally, a detailed determination of direct obligations of
business– independent from attribution to any State– is pending
under international law for all types of business; majority opinion
considers that business do not have direct obligations under
Soft-law standards define some
international law.32
responsibilities– certainly, however, no business responsibility to

Id., at 1. My translation of “Staatsnahe Unternehmen.”
See generally Yinzhi Miao, The Interplay of the State and the Firms: Overseas
Listing as a Governance Institution for Chinese SOEs, Focus: Corporate Governance from
a Comparative Perspective, 10 FRONTIERS L. CHINA 46 (2015) (discussing Chinese
government efforts to use overseas listing as a tool to restructure and discipline
SOEs).
31
Lauge Poulsen, States as Foreign Investors: Diplomatic Disputes and Legal
Fictions, 31 ICSID REV. 12, 17 (2016).
32 See generally PETER MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE
LAW (2d ed. 2007) (discussing the regulations currently imposed on Multinational
Enterprises (“MNEs”); ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NONSTATE ACTORS (Oxford University Press 2006) (exploring international case law,
statutes, and treaties to determine what, if any, obligations to non-state actors have
in international forums). But see LETNAR & VAN HO, supra note 7.
29
30
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protect– but generally, those standards remain vague, and are nonbinding.33
Finally, pressing questions of attribution arise around the issue
of past damage to the environment, or health, caused by SOEs when
domestic (and international) standards were still low or nonexistent. It will be argued in section 3 that if such negative impact
continues, it must be considered a continuous violation under
international law, even though in domestic law, statutes of
limitations apply. It will be argued that in such cases the State
should be considered directly responsible for the acts and omissions
of its SOE.
Given the challenges of access to justice in business and human
rights issues generally, and the specific difficulties that might arise
when trying to sue SOEs for human rights violations in national
courts, there is a pressing argument for defining more clearly the
type of attribution of responsibility that arises under international
human rights law and the differences between these two types of
attribution, both regarding actions and omissions of SOEs. This is
the case even though access to international human rights bodies or
foreign jurisdictional fora might as well prove illusory, due to their
notorious backlog of cases34 and in the Inter-American System,
underfunding.35
Partly, problems also arise due to limited
jurisdiction, specifically on economic, social and cultural rights.
Overall, the motive behind this paper is to at least discuss and
maybe propose a solution to some of the doctrinal or interpretive
challenges in this regard. The paper therefore does not pretend to
analyze all those issues in depth or derive conclusions on customary
international law, but rather, to draw together recent research from
different PIL disciplines around a single type of actors, i.e., SOEs,
and examine to what extent a State should be held directly
33 See generally Mares, supra note 7; Friedrich, International Environmental “Softlaw”, Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht, Springer
Verlag (2013).
34
Luzius Wildhaber, Der “Backlog” (Rückstand in der Fallbehandlung) des
Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte, in COEXISTENCE, COOPERATION AND
SOLIDARITY 1825-32 (Holger Hestermeyer et al. eds., 2012) (discussing the backlog
of cases in the European Court of Human Rights).
35 See, e.g., Ariel Dulitzky, Maximizing Justice, Minimizing Delay: Streamlining
Procedures of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, University of Texas, 21
(2011),
https://law.utexas.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2015/04/2012HRC-IACHR-Maximizing-Justice-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FU57-FPR2]
(discussing the limited resources of the Inter-American Commission on Human
rights, the “Commission suffers a chronic problem of underfunding”).
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responsible for its SOEs’ acts or omissions relating to human rights
issues.36
2.1. State responsibility and attribution: borrowing from the ILC and
from arbitral decisions
This section analyzes if and to what extent SOE’s acts and
omissions in human rights issues can be attributed directly to the
State. This will basically depend on whether these acts and
omissions can be qualified as governmental acts or not. Recently,
literature has summarized applicable criteria found in
jurisprudence; the following critical overview will be based on these
works and on the analysis of jurisprudence itself. As criteria differ
between general international law, OECD standards, the law on
state immunity, European human rights law, and Inter-American
human rights law, the respective sources will be discussed
separately. Despite an increase in recent debate and publications,37
the issue is not yet settled in international legal doctrine.
2.2. SOEs in the Draft Articles of 2001
The Draft Articles on International State Responsibility of 2001
only mention SOEs in the commentary to Article 5 when they state
that acts and omissions may be attributed if these enterprises
“exercise functions of a public character normally exercised by State

36
Sovereign Wealth Funds go beyond the scope of this paper; for an analysis
of SWF and human rights, see Angela Cummine, Ethical Sovereign Investors:
Sovereign Wealth Funds and Human Rights, in MAKING SOVEREIGN FINANCING AND
HUMAN RIGHTS WORK 163 (Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky & Jernej Letnar Černič, eds., 2014)
(discussing the links between government-financed investment and human rights
by examining sovereign wealth funds). See generally, Jiangyu Wang, State Capitalism
and Sovereign Wealth Funds: Finding a “Soft” Location in International Economic Law, in
ALTERNATIVE VISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 405 (C.L.
Lim ed., 2016) (concluding that soft legislation should develop a separate legal
framework for sovereign wealth funds).
37 See Backer, supra note 16 (discussing attribution in a more general context of
questions around SOEs and human rights).
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organs, and the conduct of the entity relates to the exercise of the
governmental authority concerned”.38
Surprisingly, the commentary to Article 8 does not mention
SOEs either, although SOEs could of course engage in de facto
exercise of public authority. Authors such as Dereje have, very
correctly in my eyes, criticized this view.39 The more consistent
approach is to treat SOEs as no different from other entities that
might exercise governmental authority without being formally
authorized to do so.40 According to Dereje’s thorough study on
general international law, arbitral tribunals have developed a more
accurate understanding of the Draft Articles; nevertheless, he found
inconsistencies when arbitral tribunals apply Articles 5 and 8 of the
Draft Articles. Although this criticism is not necessarily shared, it is
sufficiently clear that the exercise of governmental functions by
SOEs needs to be subsumed under Articles 5 (when explicitly
delegated) and 8 (when exercised de facto) by SOEs; in those cases,
state responsibility accrues for acts and omissions of SOEs.
The ILC commentary on Article 8 explicitly excludes that
government ownership and the initial establishment of the entity by
the State automatically ensue state responsibility. This point has been
accepted by literature seemingly without further debate. There is no
significant debate either about excluding the percentage of
ownership from the debate about attribution;41 no discussion about
whether there is an obligation to retain control over a SOE due to
(certain levels of) State ownership; nor about whether there is a
difference between majority or minority ownership. The sole
criterion on whether there is a link between the company and the
State is the degree of control the latter exercises over the enterprise.
In this context, the ILC Commentary adds that the analysis cannot
overlook that “what is regarded as “governmental” under Article 5
depends on the particular society, its history and traditions.”42

38
U.N. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, U.N. Doc. A/56/10,
art. 5 ¶ 2 (2001) [hereinafter ILC], http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments
/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf [https://perma.cc/T6LM-EP39].
39
DEREJE, supra note 28, at 435.
40
See DEREJE, supra note 28, at 436.
41
The statistical distinction of the World Bank on State ownership (10%) is
irrelevant, as the criterion turns on the examination of “control”—it is not
necessarily the case that a minority shareholder position implies less control.
42
ILC, supra note 38, at 43. See also Jaemin Lee, State Responsibility and
Government Affiliated Entities in International Economic Law, 49 J. WORLD TRADE 117,
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According to Dereje, in cases of Article 8 attribution, the
respective act or omission must be proven to stem from a state order
or directive, or be subject to de facto control by the State.43 The
difference with Article 5 attribution is sometimes blurry, but is
mainly an issue of proof, and structural integration of the link
between the SOE and the State itself. If a formal and stable link
between the SOE and the State cannot be shown, it might still be
possible that the lower threshold of Article 8 is met, which only
requires some kind of formal instruction or instances of control, not
necessarily a detailed instruction on a legal or regulatory basis.44
The most relevant question in doctrinal debate generally is,
however, just as for the purposes of the present argument, whether
and when SOEs could come under Article 4 of the Draft Articles, that
is, under a definition of “state organ.” The commentary to Article 4
is silent about the issue of SOE—this means that the Draft Articles
do not conceive of any hypotheses under which SOEs could come
under the definition of state organs.45 If an entity is controlled by
the State, maybe even if not completely, but in a sufficiently
important manner, does this indicate that it is a state organ? As Lee
puts it: “More specifically, problems have arisen when Article 4
analyses attempt to address (i) governmental ownership, (ii)
relevant societal or cultural contexts, and/or (iii) the function being
carried out by the entity in question.”46 Li for his part insists,
likewise, in considering different local specificities of SOEs, showing
that Chinese SOEs function quite differently from their Western
counterparts.47 The Commentary on Draft Article 5 accounts of such
138 (2015) (emphasizing the importance of cultural context in the determination of
what is “governmental”).
43 See DEREJE, supra note 28, at 435–36.
44
See DEREJE, supra note 28, at 421–424; see also ILC, supra note 38, commentary
to art. 8.
45 See Lee, supra note 42 (arguing that international courts have discarded the
approach of the ILC in defining “state organs”); State Immunity and State-Owned
Enterprises,
CLIFFORD
CHANCE
(2008),
https://businesshumanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/bhr/files/Clifford-Chance-Stateimmunity-state-owned-enterprises-Dec-2008.PDF [https://perma.cc/6NZP-LBT3]
(noting that the commentary to article 5 states that entities who “may be
empowered by the law of a State to exercise elements of governmental authority”
may not be state organs). But see DEREJE, supra note 28, at 401.
46
Lee, supra note 42, at 127.
47 See Ji Li, State-Owned Enterprises in the Current Regime of Investor-State
Arbitration, in THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN INVESTOR STATE ARBITRATION 380, 403
(Shaheeza Lalani & Rodrigo Polanco Lazo eds., 2015) (demonstrating “significant
variations among SOEs” in China).
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differences, too, when indicating that governmental functions
depend on “the particular society, its history and traditions”.48 Lee,
concluding, suggests resolving the issues by including an explicit
definition of “state organ” in newly negotiated treaty texts.49 This
would also allow to ensure that no specific references to types of
conduct or functions are necessary when determining the scope of
the term “state organ”, and would permit that those tests are
relegated exclusively to examinations under Articles 5 and 8. Dereje
argues that the differences between the Draft Articles and ICJ
jurisprudence on Article 4 need to be harmonized considering that
an entity should be considered a state organ if it does not enjoy
sufficient autonomy, independent of whether the entity has a legal
He shows that the
personality separate from the State.50
examination of attribution under Article 4 Draft Articles that the ICJ
carries out, is consistent, systematic and suitable to clarify confusion
that might arise under the ILC commentary. In Article 4 tests, the
question of ownership should not play a role, as both Dereje and Lee
argue. Lee explains:
There may be a chain of command and organic relationship
among various governmental agencies of all sorts and levels,
but ( . . . ) looking into the governmental ownership in the
course of Article 4 state organ discussions, does not fit into
the basic structure embodied in the ILC Draft Articles.51
The question that ensues for Lee is: what about the “chain of
command” type argument when there is close control of an SOE by
governmental organs?52 It seems that this question could be brought
under considerations of Article 4, or if not applicable for other
reasons, Article 5 of the Draft Articles. As Dereje summarizes, the
line between Article 4 and Article 5 attribution is not always that
clear.53

ILC, supra note 38, at 43, commentary to art. 5, ¶ 6.
Lee, supra note 42, at 147.
50
DEREJE, supra note 28, at 401–403.
51
Lee, supra note 42, at 130.
52 See Ru Ding, Public Body or Not: Chinese State-Owned Enterprise, 48 J. WORLD
TRADE 167 (2014) (stating that the debate on the scope of “public body” vs. “state
organ” in WTO jurisprudence needs not to be addressed here, as it would seem that
the differentiation does not fundamentally change issues in the context of human
rights obligations).
53
DEREJE, supra note 28, at 415.
48
49
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Taking these issues together, the following criteria for
attribution can be summarized, following Dereje’s systematization:
attribution requires effective control, which is usually given if
structural control is taking place.
This criterion is not
controversial.54 The foundation by the State is not decisive for the
later attribution of state responsibility, just as State ownership is
not.55 Rather, structural elements such as the State’s voting rights in
the SOE are critical, together with the right to nominate and
withdraw leading executives56 and the right to give concrete
instructions or to exercise veto powers.57 Finally, reporting and
accountability obligations, just as the public presentation of the SOE,
especially by state officials, is an element that must be taken into
account when deciding attribution in concrete cases.58 It is very
relevant to note in the present context that human rights compliance
of the obligation to fulfill is always considered a governmental
function. This becomes clear when, for example, the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights decides in Ximenes Lopes vs. Brazil that
despite privatization and/or concessioning of the country’s mental
health system, the State remains responsible for preventing human
rights violations in those private institutions.59 The Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has used a similar approach
regarding the right to the highest attainable standard of health,60 the
right to water, and also in relation to equality between men and
women.61 The European Court of Human Rights has, however, been

DEREJE, supra note 28, at 401.
DEREJE, supra note 28, at 405.
56
DEREJE, supra note 28, at 406.
57
DEREJE, supra note 28, at 407, 410.
58
DEREJE, supra note 28, at 411–12.
59 See Ximenes Lopes v. Brazil, Preliminary Exceptions, Merits, Reparations
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No. 149 (July 4, 2006),
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_149_ing.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AM7X-KEPK] (holding that Brazil had violated the rights to life
and humane treatment of a mental health patient).
60 See CESCR, General Comment No. 14: The right to the highest attainable standard
of health (art. 12), ¶. 12(b) and 35, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000),
https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4538838d0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X5LR3VQ6] (stressing accessibility as essential elements in the provision of right to health
and duties of states to provide equal access).
61 See CESCR, General Comment No. 16: The equal right of men and women to the
enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights (art. 3 of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2005/4 (Aug. 11, 2005),
https://www.refworld.org/docid/43f3067ae.html
[https://perma.cc/Q8B454
55
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more cautious, and as stated in Hatton vs. United Kingdom, awards a
“wide margin of appreciation”62 on how to regulate private
services.63
2.3. OECD standards on SOE and the report of the WG on Business
and Human Rights
The OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of StateOwned Enterprises principally address States; they are not directed
to the companies themselves. This is, in the first place, indirect
evidence for the close relationship that exists or may exist between
SOEs and the State. The Guidelines nevertheless insist, more than
any other international document on SOEs, on the separation
between the State and the SOE, especially regarding the selection of
board members and CEOs. This becomes most apparent in their
recommendation of several measures that distance the enterprise
from the principal, i.e., the State.64 The Guidelines explicitly
establish that SOEs should not have to perform “charitable acts or to
provide public services that would more appropriately be carried
out by the relevant public authorities.”65 Contrary to the empirical
evidence, which shows that many States have opted to provide
public services through SOEs,66 the OECD seems to push States
towards SOEs that have exclusively utility objectives, not policy
objectives. The mere fact, however, that the Guidelines are
addressed to the State—both as owner and regulator of SOEs—
makes it clear that their actions and omissions cannot be easily
separated from the State and its responsibility, even with regard to
management, and human rights risk management. This fact should

DSVR] (clarifying state actors’ responsibility to monitor and regulate non-state
actors to ensure equal rights to enjoy social, economic and cultural rights).
62 See Hatton and others v. the UK, Eur. Ct. H.R., Reports 2003-VIII (July 8, 2003),
¶ 100-101, https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-61188%22]}
[https://perma.cc/2VZ2-U5RH] (discussing whether an increase in night flights to
London Heathrow Airport violated the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms by increasing noise levels for those living under
the approach flight path).
63 On human rights obligations in the process of and after privatization, see
generally Hallo de Wolf, supra note 19, at 126-198.
64
OECD, supra note 8, passim.
65
OECD, supra note 8, at 60.
66
OECD, supra note 8, at 7, 30.
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at least be taken into account when discussing attribution, and the
political options the OECD suggests are to be taken.
The Guidelines directly reference human rights, when indicating
that “SOEs should observe high standards of responsible business
conduct, including with regards to the environment, employees,
public health and safety, and human rights. The state’s expectations
regarding the responsible business conduct of SOEs should be
disclosed in a clear and transparent manner.”67 The role of boards
and management is to ensure that those expectations “are integrated
into the corporate governance of SOEs, supported by incentives and
subject to appropriate reporting and performance monitoring.”68
If the normative ideal of the OECD Guidelines were
implemented faithfully by States, it seems that no direct attribution
would arise. While Chapter 17 of the Transpacific Partnership
maintained the OECD approach, it is more realistic when
establishing, in line with the Draft Articles, that when a SOE carries
out governmental functions, these actions or omissions can be
attributed to the State (Art. 17.3). As several authors indicate, the
definition of “governmental authority” or “governmental
functions” is still pending.69 For Li, SOEs should only be excluded
from investor-state arbitration if they “discharge clear and
narrowly-defined governmental functions.”70 It will be argued in
sections 3.1 and 3.2 that regional human rights jurisprudence has a
consistent response to this conundrum, at least with regard to SOE
related human rights guarantees, and that in those cases,
governmental functions are precisely, but not narrowly, defined.
Indirectly, the OECD confirms that interpretation, when its 2015
report suggests that public services (corresponding to the fulfillment
of human rights) should be kept clearly within state responsibility.
The UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights based
its report on SOEs and Guiding Principle 4 on SOEs, on the OECD
Guidelines of 2015. The Guiding Principles nor the report mention
or discuss issues of attribution. While criticizing the details of the
report, Catá Backer coincides that only a governance approach to
SOE human rights responsibility can effectively cover the real modus
OECD, supra note 8, at 57–61.
Id. at 60.
69 See Petrochilos, supra note 13, at 353–360; see also Lee, supra note 42; DEREJE,
supra note 28.
70 See Li, supra note 47, at 404 (following the arbitral tribunal in the case
Československa Obchodní Banka, A.S. (CSOB) v. The Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No
ARB/97/4, Decision on Jurisdiction (May 24, 1999)).
67
68
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operandi of SOEs.71 This approach—as well as Catá Backer’s
recommendations—departs from the approach UN and regional
human rights treaty bodies have taken on SOEs. These bodies
consider that States owe the obligation to respect under human
rights treaties,72 rather than only being encouraged to “lead by
example,”73 adopting human rights due diligence policies that are to
be above industry standards (rather than in line with the minimum
core of international human rights obligations).
Catá Backer, who does not discuss the issue of attribution in debt,
considers that the Guiding Principles introduce a contradiction
regarding the human rights responsibility of SOEs. By defining a
special rule for SOEs in Guiding Principle 4, they create a
“disjunction” from the business responsibilities of pillar 2.74 This
reading should be considered overly pessimistic about the
consistency of the Guiding Principles. It seems, rather, that, just as
companies, SOEs have to respect human rights just as defined in
pillar 2, but as state-owned companies, they have to do better about
this than private companies, and additionally, state responsibility
can arise pursuant to their violations. Looking at SOEs from the
perspective of international human rights law, however, finds both
readings problematic. Neither can a SOEs claim in all situations
that it is “only” a company or an “exemplary” company, nor does a
careful reading of the Guiding Principles exclude Catá Backer’s
claim that SOEs are to be subject to governance related measures on
business and human rights—as their internal structure and relation
with their supply chains actually are based on a company-logic, not
a public-law logic.
Catá Backer, supra note 16.
See, e.g., UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR),
General Comment No. 23 (2016) on the right to just and favourable conditions of work
(article 7 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), ¶ 58,
U.N.
Doc.
E/C.12/GC/23
(Apr.
26,
2016),
https://www.refworld.org/docid/5550a0b14.html
[https://perma.cc/RML7QFTZ] (“First, State parties have an obligation to respect the right by refraining
from interfering directly or indirectly with its enjoyment. This is particularly
important when the State is the employer including in State owned or State
controlled enterprises.”).
73 See UN Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational
corporations and other business enterprises, Report on State-owned Enterprises, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/32/45 (May 4, 2016) [hereinafter UN Working Group],
http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=A/HRC/32/45&Lang=E
[https://perma.cc/2QKP-L67T] (illustrating what States are expected to do in their
role as owners of enterprises and rationale).
74 See Catá Backer, supra note 16, at 860–61.
71
72
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The present research provides arguments on the end contrary to
Catá Backer’s concern: it looks at the “state-like” elements of SOEs
and argues, precisely, for enhanced State accountability in relation
to SOE’s human rights violations. Not because the SOE is governed
or administered as a public organ; rather, because the SOEs private
body is closely linked to the State—by control or by function. To use
an image, this research looks at making sense of the fact that SOEs
continue to be linked to the State through complex but not less
evident, umbilical cords.
2.4. State immunity and State-owned Enterprises
There is an additional criterion that may be taken into account
when establishing whether an entity must be considered a state
organ or exercising any kind of governmental function. States tend
to claim immunity in foreign or arbitral courts if they consider that
a certain activity is sovereign.75 To a certain extent this also applies
to SOEs.76 According to the 2004 Convention, immunity may be
claimed when a SOE performs governmental functions; more
precisely, when “agencies or instrumentalities of the State or other
entities, to the extent that they are entitled to perform and are
actually performing acts in the exercise of sovereign authority of the
State” (Art. 2.1b.iii).
Various authors have criticized the ambiguous language in the
2004 Convention on the Immunity of States and their Property,
which leads to difficulties in determining the concrete status of SOEs
under that Convention.77 In addition, the concept of state immunity
may well be abused in the context of state enterprises and several
authors claim that this indeed occurs.78 Be this as it may, invoking
state immunity is evidence that the State considers a certain entity
as a state organ, or as exercising governmental functions.79 It should
75
For a useful overview of state immunity doctrines in the UK, US and 2004
Convention on State Immunity, see generally CLIFFORD CHANCE, supra note 45;
HAZEL FOX & PHILIPPA WEBB, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY (3d ed. 2015).
76 See generally PULLEN, supra note 14.
77 See CLIFFORD CHANCE, supra note 45, at 17.
78 See Lee, supra note 42.
79 See UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their
Property, Arts. 2 and 10(3), U.N. Doc. A/59/508, (Dec. 2, 2004),
https://treaties.un.org/doc/source/recenttexts/english_3_13.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HN5B-82UY] (clarifying that when a state is capable of suing or
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therefore, simply for the sake of consistency, not be able to avoid
state responsibility and direct attribution of its acts or omissions, as
it would be a logical error to uphold, simultaneously, that a SOE
should enjoy state immunity, but not generate state responsibility.
As Van Aaken argued in 2014, recent jurisprudence by the
ECtHR and ICJ shows that indeed, immunity does not automatically
exclude human rights concerns, but must be balanced against
human rights obligations.80 In that sense, Catá Backer’s 2017
recommendation on this specific issue had already entered into
human rights jurisprudence.81 The ILC furthermore suggests that
certain commercial activities that are undertaken for the public
good, such as purchase of food or medicine in emergency situations,
could qualify for granting immunity. Finally, regulatory immunity
might apply to SOEs, and they might eventually be immune from
execution, especially in relation to decisions handed down against
the State (and not the SOE itself).82
3.

HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE

The criteria for attribution presented in sections 2.1–2.3 stem
from general international law. Being interested specifically in
human rights responsibility of SOEs, however, it is impossible not
to revise whether human rights instruments or jurisprudence define
specific rules on the attribution of state responsibility; if this were
the case, those rules would have to be applied in substitution to
general international law, due to the principle of lex specialis.83 The
two International Covenants are silent on the issue, and only speak
of “states” as owners of obligations.
The same is true for the European Convention on Human Rights
and the American Convention on Human Rights; the InterAmerican Court has never explicitly argued on the issue of
being sued or possesses legal personality, its immunity cannot be affected); see also
Anne Van Aaken, Blurring Boundaries between Sovereign Acts and Commercial
Activities: A Functional View on Regulatory Immunity and Immunity from Execution, in
IMMUNITIES 131, 143–145 (Anne Peters ed., 2014) (observing that SOEs are granted
sovereign immunity for activities where the SEO is exercising sovereignty, i.e.
performing government functions); FOX & WEB, supra note 75.
80
Van Aaken, supra note 79, at 140.
81
Catá Backer, supra note 16, at 38.
82
Van Aaken, supra note 79, at 149–157, 157–168.
83
ILC, supra note 38, art. 55.
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attribution. However, it has decided several cases involving Stateowned enterprises, simply applying an Article 4 hypothesis. Thus,
in Kichwa Indigenous Community of Sarayaku vs. Ecuador, the regional
Court simply assumed the governmental function of a SOE, which
was in charge of administrating oil concessions, without debate and
without dissenting opinions. The implicit criteria the Court is using
will be spelt out in section 3.2.
In the European Court of Human Rights, in turn, criteria of
attribution have been discussed explicitly, and have also been
analyzed in—although scarce84—literature (see section 3.1). As will
be shown in the light of jurisprudence, these criteria provide a better
understanding of the way in which States have to be responsible for
the acts and omissions of their enterprises in human rights matters.
What will become clear is that in international human rights law,
more than in general international law, there are hypotheses of
attribution which responds more clearly to the effectiveness
standard regarding access to justice.
3.1 Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights
The European Court has discussed many cases that involve, in
some way or the other, state-owned enterprises or state property.
The present analysis only looks at those cases in which the Court has
discussed attribution matters.
In Fadeyeva vs. Russia, the European Court of Human Rights was
asked to decide on state responsibility for the failure to resettle a
person living close to a steel plant, which was responsible for 95%
of the air pollution in the city. Although the diseases the woman
suffered from could not be derived directly from air pollution, the
Court found that the State had not struck a fair balance between the
dangerous situation in which the applicant was in, and other
interests, especially, the interests of other persons on the council
housing waiting list, which should have been considered less urgent
if not exposed to the same health threat. On attribution, the Court
concluded—after taking into account private ownership at the
84 See generally Mikko Rajavuori, How Should States Own? Heinisch v. Germany
and the Emergence of Human Rights Sensitive State Ownership, 26 EUROPEAN J. INT’L L.
727 (2015), http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/26/3/2603.pdf [https://perma.cc/P68UUT2M] (suggesting that the notion of public shareholder is helpful in
understanding how states should govern the human rights performance of
corporations through ownership).
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moment of the complaint, the State obligation to regulate and
exercise oversight, and initial State-ownership—that:
The authorities in the present case were certainly in a
position to evaluate the pollution hazards and to take
adequate measures to prevent or reduce them. The
combination of these factors shows a sufficient nexus between
the pollutant emissions and the State to raise an issue of the
State’s positive obligation under Article 8 of the
Convention.85
It is not clear, however, if or why the fact that the company had
been privatized actually had any impact on the outcome of the case.
The ratio turns entirely on the illegality of operating without a
“safety belt” around the enterprise, and the failure to resettle the
claimant,86 both activities intimately linked to the responsibilities of
oversight organs or state organs responsible for public services.
In Uj vs. Hungary, to the contrary, the Court found that the
“reputational interest” of a SOE was “commercial” in nature, and
therefore, not protected under the morals limitations to the freedom
of expression.87 In cases such as Industrial Financial Consortium
Investment Metallurgical Union vs. Ukraine, which dealt with the
fairness of privatization proceedings of a SOE, attribution criteria
were neither an issue.
More telling regarding attribution is the question whether a
state-owned entity would have any standing under the ECHR (and
therefore, would not be considered part of the State it belonged to)
is the judgment in Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping vs. Turkey, where
the Court assessed the entity’s “legal status and, where appropriate,
the rights that status gives it, the nature of the activity it carries out
and the context in which it is carried out, and the degree of its
independence from the political authorities.”88 For the Court, the

85 See Fadeyeva v. Russia, Judgment, 45 Eur.Ct.H.R. 10, ¶ 92 (2005) (“The
Court concludes that the authorities in the present case were certainly in a position
to evaluate the pollution hazards and to take adequate measures to prevent or
reduce them. The combination of these factors shows a sufficient nexus between the
pollutant emissions and the State to raise an issue of the State’s positive obligation
under Article 8 of the Convention.”).
86 Id. at ¶116–134.
87 See Uj v. Hungary, App. No. 23954/10, Eur. Ct. H.R.¶ 22 (2011) (finding that
commercial reputational considerations do not implicate a moral dimension).
88 See Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping v. Turkey, App. No. 40998/98 Eur. Ct.
H.R. 1081, ¶ 79 (2007) (reasoning that the entity being considered “neither
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control over the company was decisive, not who held the property
in it. Comparing the criteria of the ECtHR with the criteria in arbitral
jurisprudence, the human rights court uses one additional criterion
to determine the business-state nexus: the nature of a company’s
activities. This criterion seems to mirror, the OECD concern on
maintaining public services within the public realm (see section 2.2).
In Transpetrol vs. Slovakia, the Court applied a slightly more
detailed list of criteria in order to establish whether a State-owned
company could have standing under the Convention, as a claimant
against the State, which at the time of the facts, held 51% of
ownership in the company. The Court dismissed this argument,
considering that:
The applicant company was a private-law entity subject to
the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts and to the same legal
regime as any other commercial company in Slovakia. It did
not have immunity, did not carry out any publicadministration functions and did not participate in the
exercise of public power.89
Furthermore, “[t]he applicant company had professional
management and its operations were of a commercial nature. The
State carried no liability for the applicant company’s obligations and
the applicant company was subject to the normal rules and
procedures concerning insolvency.”90 In addition, it was relevant
for the Court that the company did not enjoy a monopoly position.91
The Court found it critical that the entity “is governed essentially by
company law, does not enjoy any governmental or other powers
beyond those conferred by ordinary private law in the exercise of its
activities and is subject to the jurisdiction of the ordinary rather than
the administrative courts.”92 Additionally, the Court found a joint
interests in the proceedings, as the State acted as a common
intervener, and the SOE was represented by the same lawyer as the
State in other proceedings.93

participates in the exercise of governmental powers nor has a public-service role or
a monopoly in a competitive sector.”).
89 See Transpetrol v. Slovakia, Ap. No. 28502/08 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Third Section)
¶ 58. (2011).
90 Id.
91 Id. ¶ 62.
92 Id. ¶ 61.
93 Id. ¶ 74.
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In the case Luganskvugillya vs. Ukraine, the ECtHR had to
evaluate whether a Ukrainian coal company could be considered
having ius standi against Ukraine. The court argued that:
The applicant company is managed and fully controlled by
the Government of Ukraine, through its various institutional
structures, including formerly through the Ministry of Fuel
and Energy of Ukraine and currently the Ministry of Coal
Industry of Ukraine. The company exercised certain public
functions in administration of funds allocated by the State
for restructuring of the coal industry.94
The Court found that the petition was inadmissible. It is not
clear from the judgment which role liquidation proceedings play in
the attribution (or not) of state responsibility. In other decisions,
however, the Court considered that the non-applicability of
insolvency laws suggests attribution of state responsibility.95
Regarding the issue of whether the State must be considered
vicariously liable for debts of State-owned or State-related
companies, the Court reiterated regarding attribution in Yershova vs.
Russia—a case over a formerly State-owned steel plant, which
significantly contaminated the town where the claimant lived, that:
[T]he Court will have regard to such factors as the
company’s legal status, the rights that such status gives it,
the nature of the activity it carries out and the context in
which it is carried out, and the degree of its independence
from the authorities ( . . . ). The Court will notably have to
consider whether the company enjoyed sufficient
institutional and operational independence from the State to
absolve the latter from its responsibility under the
Convention for its acts and omissions.96
It thus puts emphasis on the independence from the State, but
also confirmed the “nature of activities” criterion of earlier
jurisprudence.
The Court also pointed out that “the applicant company’s
domestic legal status as a separate legal entity does not, on its own,
absolve the State from its responsibility under the Convention for
94 See State Holding Company Luganskvugillya v. Ukraine, App. No.
23938/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Fifth Section) 2 (2009).
95 See Transpetrol, supra note 89, ¶ 58.
96 Yershova v. Russia, App. No. 1387/04 Eur. Ct. HR (2010) (First Section), ¶ 55.
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the company’s debts.”97 This is certainly an important limitation to
abuse by separate corporate entities, when these are acting de facto
on the State’s behalf. While highlighting in the Yershova case that
the nexus between State and company was not as close as in the
Mykhaylenky case,98 the court concluded that “given in particular the
public nature of the company’s functions, the significant control over
its assets by the municipal authority and the latter’s decisions
resulting in the transfer of these assets and the company’s
subsequent liquidation,” it was the State that was “to be held
responsible under the Convention for [the company’s] acts and
omissions.”99 The Court spelled out the meaning of “nature” and
linked the concept to the consideration of whether the company’s
functions were “public” (governmental in other contexts). This
means that the acts and omissions of state-owned public services
companies have to be considered more readily attributable to the
State.
On the same token, in Heinisch vs. Germany, the Court found in
2011 that public shareholders have major obligations of due
diligence and investigation into possible wrongdoing or
negligence;100 the Court explained that:
[W]hile the Court accepts that State-owned companies also
have an interest in commercial viability, it nevertheless
points out that the protection of public confidence in the
quality of the provision of vital public service by Stateowned or administered companies is decisive for the
functioning and economic good of the entire sector. For this
reason the public shareholder itself has an interest in

Id. ¶ 56.
Id. ¶ 57 (“the Court notes the Government’s argument that the degree of the
State’s involvement in the company’s activities cannot be equated with that in
the Mykhaylenky and Others case.”).
99 Id. ¶ 62 emphasis added.
100 See Rajavuori, supra note 84, at 736 (discussing the result of Heiniscich v.
Germany, in which he believes the court gave public shareholders of an SOE a
second obligation and purpose. “When a company in the state’s portfolio is
involved in human rights-sensitive activity, a public shareholder should allow for
a thorough examination, investigating and clarifying the alleged deficiencies on the
issue”); see, e.g., Heinisch v. Germany, 2011 V Eur. Ct. H.R. 229, ¶ 71 (observing that
it is especially important for state-owned companies’ to disseminate information to
public shareholders).
97
98
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investigating and clarifying alleged deficiencies in this
respect within the scope of an open public debate.101
This rationale has not been reiterated explicitly, however. In a
case in 2016, the Court did not provide a response to a similar
argument submitted by the applicant,102 and there has not been any
opportunity to know whether the Grand Chamber would agree with
the reasoning of the Chamber. The argument, however, is consistent
with the viewpoint of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in
Ximenes Lopes vs. Brazil, where the regional body considered that
even private actors carrying out health services on behalf of the
State, have to be regulated following strict due diligence standards,
as if they were in fact public services.103
In Mykhaylenky, the Court solved a question on debts generated
by SOEs towards its workers, holding that the State was liable. The
reason was that:
The debtor company had operated in the highly regulated
sphere of nuclear energy and conducted its construction
activities in the Chernobyl zone of compulsory evacuation,
which is placed under strict governmental control on
account of environmental and public-health considerations,
[especially, that] the State [had] prohibited the seizure of the
company’s property on account of possible contamination.104
The Court also considered relevant that the company
management was in the hands of the Ministry of Energy, and not an
independent board.105 Just as with monopolies, the more regulated
an area of economy in which the SOE operates is, the more
attributable an activity is.
In Alisic, the ECtHR confirmed Mykhaylenky insofar “a State may
be responsible for debts of a State-owned company, even if the
Id. para. 89.
See generally Langner v. Germany, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 14464/11 (Fifth
Section) (2016).
103 See Ximenes Lopes v. Brazil, Preliminary Exceptions, Merits, Reparations
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No. 149, ¶ 141 (July 4, 2006) (“The
Court has established that the duty of the States to regulate and supervise the
institutions which provide health care services, as a necessary measure aimed at the
due protection of the life and integrity of the individuals under their jurisdiction,
includes both public and private institutions which provide public health care
services, as well as those institutions which provide only private health care.”). See,
e.g, id. ¶27 (Ramirez, J., concurring).
104
Mykhaylenky v. Ukraine, Eur. Ct. H.R (Second Section) ¶ 45, (2005).
105 Id.
101
102
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company is a separate legal entity, provided that it does not enjoy
sufficient institutional and operational independence from the State
to absolve the latter from its responsibility under the Convention.”106
The test of previous jurisprudence was thus reiterated,107 and
recently applied in Krndija vs. Serbia108 and Burmych vs. Ukraine.109
The Court specified:
In this kind of cases, the Court needs to examine whether the
non-enforcement was caused by the delay attributable to the
respondent State itself, or whether the insolvency of the
debtor company could have made it objectively impossible
for the respondent State to honour its obligation to enforce
the judicial decision in the applicant’s favour.110
As the State had not provided any explanation as to why the
judgment could not be enforced, the Court found the State
responsible under the European Convention under the effet utile
principle.111
In several recent cases that involved SOEs, no mention
whatsoever was made regarding attribution.112 The case of
Śimaitienè, allowed the Court to reiterate its previous jurisprudence
regarding past violations of the right to property by a former SOE,
106 See Aliśič et al. v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Eur. Ct. H.R. Grand Chamber
App. No. 60642/08 ¶ 114 (2014).
107 Id.; see also, Voronkov v. Russia, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No 39678/03 ¶ 47 (2015)
(“The court reiterates that a state may be responsible for debts of a State—owned
company, even if the company is a separate legal entity.”).
108
Krndija et al. v. Serbia, Eur Ct. H.R. App. No. 30723/09 (Third Section) ¶
66 (2017) (“The court observes that . . . decisions rendered against a socially/stateowned company . . . that the state is directly liable for their debts and omissions.”).
109
Yuriy Nikolayevich Ivanov v. Ukraine, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 40450/04 ¶
36, 78-82 (2010) (discussing implementation of a pilot program based off of the
Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers in 2004 that would enable human
rights claims of a similar nature to go directly to a specific state body as to
streamline enforcement rather than hinder the courts with similar issues); Burmych
v. Ukraine, Eur. Ct. H.R. Grand Chamber App. No. 46852/13 ¶ 11 (2017) ( following
the Ivanov pilot decision to implement a pilot program in Ukraine).
110
See Krndija, supra note 108, ¶ 68.
111 See Krndija, supra note 108, ¶ 68, 73–74.
112 See generally Surikov v. Ukraine, Eur. Ct. H.R App. No. 42788/06 (2017)
(failing to even mention attribution); Dickmann and Gion v. Romania, Eur. Ct.
H.R App. No. 10346/03 and 10893/04 ¶ 14, 18-20 (2017) (assuming attribution by
virtue of jointly suing the municipality and a municipal enterprise); Medzlis v.
Bosnia, Eur. Ct H.R. App. No. 17224/11 ¶ 80 (2017); Merabishvili v. Georgia, Eur.
Ct. H.R. App. No. 72508/13 (2017) (regarding the detention of a CEO to coerce sale
of private company to a SOE, where the Court’s argument was entirely based on
direct state responsibility of security forces).
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which held that partial restitution and compensation were sufficient
to repair the damage.113
In 2018, finally, the Court explicitly pronounced itself on state
responsibility of Bulgaria with regard to the actions (and omissions)
of a state-owned mine. The Court explained:
The mine was managed by a company which was entirely
State-owned. For the Court, the fact that that company was a
separate legal entity under domestic law cannot be decisive
to rule out the State’s direct responsibility under the
Convention. The parties have provided no information on
the extent of State supervision and control of the company at
the relevant time. Of relevance is that it was not engaged in
ordinary commercial business, operating instead in a heavily
regulated field subject to environmental and health-andsafety requirements. It is also significant that the decision to
create the mine was taken by the State, which also
expropriated numerous privately-owned properties in the
area to allow for its functioning, under legislation concerning
“especially important State needs”. All of the above factors
demonstrate that the company was the means of conducting a State
activity and that, accordingly, the State must be held
responsible for its acts or omissions raising issues under the
Convention.114
It thus reiterated and specified the threshold for state
responsibility, including, interestingly, a new aspect: the reference
to the degree of environmental and health-and-safety regulation,
which differentiated the nature of the activities from usual
“commercial activities.” Future jurisprudence should clarify this
reasoning, as the strong regulation seems to be generally related to
the dangerous character of activities, rather than their noncommercial character. Therefore, this indicator should not be
included in an attribution checklist until further specified or
confirmed by the Court. Finally, in Könyv-Tár Kft and Others, the
Court in 2018 found Hungary responsible for indirect expropriation
through the creation of a monopoly administered by a SOE. The
finding of the violation was based, however, on the evaluation of
113 See Śimaitienè v. Lithuania, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 550556/10 ¶ 53 (2017)
(finding that partial restitution and compensation are appropriate remedies for
property which cannot be returned).
114 See Dimitar Yordanov v. Bulgaria, ECHR App. No,. 3401/09 ¶60 (2018).
References to case-law omitted. Emphasis added.
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government action and SOE action, and therefore, the case is not too
useful for defining differentiate criteria of attribution. The same is
true for Kurşun vs. Turkey where the SR originated from failures in
the investigative process into a gas explosion, and Khadija Ismayilova,
a wiretapping case in which Azerbaijan was found responsible for
not investigating correctly into whether wiretapping to an
opposition leader was carried out pursuant to specific orders by a
state-owned telecommunications company, or pursuant to
unofficial orders by some of that company’s employees.115
While coinciding with arbitral jurisprudence regarding
attribution on several issues, the European Court of Human Rights
has been clear and consistent on including two important points in
its analysis. First, the nature of SOE activities. Very recently, it
included the consideration of environmental and health-and-safety
regulation into that analysis. Second, it seems that more often than
not, the Court implicitly departs from a Draft Article 4 assessment;
in such cases, it revises globally (not separately for SOE and
oversight organs) whether, on the merits, the Convention rights
have been guaranteed. It is only in its admissibility jurisprudence
that the Court addresses SOE issues separately. It would seem that
a more detailed argument on direct and indirect State responsibility
would be useful, in order to effectively distinguish, for example, the
different levels of due diligence that the State as a whole owes.
3.2. Reasoning in the Inter-American System of Human Rights
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights dealt with several
cases involving a SOE without discussing attribution at all. Instead,
the Court simply assumed attribution and eventually, found the
States responsible for several of the violations alleged. Thus, for
example, in Abrill Alosilla vs. Peru, a case on unlawful dismissal of
civil servants, workers and technical staff employed in a SOE,
attribution of the violations to the State was not even mentioned,
and less so, argued upon. The SOE was dealt with on the same
footing as a ministry. Similarly, in Sarayaku vs. Ecuador, the Court
analyzed the role of the Ecuadorian SOE Petroecuador, a contractual
partner of a private company that gained the right to explore and
115 See Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. 65286/13 and
57270/14 ¶ 125 (2018) (finding that investigative deficiencies on the part of the state
contributed to an inability to conclude state responsibility).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss4/4

2019] State-Owned Enterprise Responsibility in Human Rights

925

exploit an oil concession through said contract.116 Petroecuador in
addition carried out oversight functions in relation to environmental
regulation, permits117 and closure of the activities.118 The Court did
not explicitly problematize the role of the SOE, but treated it without
discussion by any of the parties before the Court, and in this author’s
view, correctly, as a regulatory organ rather than an enterprise,
although the form of the concession, and especially, the assertion
that there were no “environmental impacts” after closure, were
solely covered in private law instruments (contracts).119 For the
outcome of the case, it was significant that Petroecuador had passed
on a request for military intervention by the concessionary to the
Ministry of Defense;120 the intervention of the thus solicited armed
forces resulted in violations of members of the Sarayaku indigenous
community’s right to life. Also, at the domestic level, the Ecuadorian
Ombudsman found Petroecuador responsible, in the context of the
operations of the private enterprise, for incompliance with the
obligation to protect from violations of constitutional and
international human rights.121 This confirms the belief that
international law is applicable to SOE as a state organ, by virtue of
its close nexus with the State.
The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights has not made
an argument on attribution either. It referred briefly to SOEs when
observing in its 2016 report on Indigenous Peoples’ rights and
extractive industries, that State obligations include oversight over
SOEs and control by independent state organs.122 The Commission
also referred to Guiding Principle 4 on State-Owned Enterprises and
the expectation that they lead by example the efforts of the industry
to respect human rights.123 Otherwise, the language shows
preoccupation that despite State ownership, SOEs need to be subject

116
Pueblo Indígena Kichwa de Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Preliminary Exceptions,
Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) 245, ¶64–64
(June 27, 2012).
117 Id. ¶ 67.
118 Id. ¶ 123.
119 Id. ¶ 64, 123.
120 Id. ¶ 192.
121 Id. ¶ 195.
122 See IACHR, supra note 24, ¶ 101 (“Therefore, in the opinion of the IACHR,
when extractive and development projects are implemented by State-run
companies, the State is required to implement measures of strict supervision.”).
123 Id. ¶ 100.
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to oversight mechanisms.124 The Commission’s view seems to build
on the experience that SOEs in some countries operate beyond
regulation and control, and enjoy privileges that private companies
do not enjoy. However, there has been no development on the legal
criteria of attribution.
Most significantly in its recent quasi-judicial activity, the
Commission had to decide over the admissibility of a complaint
against Peru, regarding severe contamination by the La Oroya
industrial complex. The metallurgic industry was owned by the
State between 1974 and 1997, and then sold to Doe Run, a US
company.125 The parties had agreed on the fact that when Doe Run
bought the factory, the environmental obligations were to be
divided in two parts: the private enterprise would be responsible for
the installation of pending and new environmental measures, and
the State of Peru assumed responsibility for the clean-up of the soils
contaminated before 1997.126 The agreement between the private
investor and the State would suggest that the State considers itself
responsible for clean-up regarding past contamination, even though
environmental legislation at the time of pollution had not yet been
in force. The available information does not tell whether Peru
considers this an international obligation; an obligation under
domestic law only; or whether the agreement was simply an
outcome of the balance of forces between the US Company and the
State.127 But it can be expected to be a significant element for
knowing about the Commission’s understanding of SOE
obligations, when the IAS body will have to decide on whether the
agreement was in conformity with the American Convention on
Human Rights.
Overall, the Inter-American human rights bodies have not had
the opportunity to discuss the responsibilities of SOEs as investors
or enterprises rather than regulators; a very recent case on the
dismissal of workers from Peruvian SOEs was decided exactly on
the same token as dismissals by ministries.128 The criterion used in
Abrill Alosilla has thus not changed, and it is unclear whether it is the
level of control, the functions of the SOEs or simply state-ownership
which determine the type of attribution that applies.
124
125
126
127
128

Id. ¶ 101.
La Oroya, supra note 4, ¶ 10.
La Oroya, supra note 4, ¶ 10.
This point cannot be addressed in this paper.
Trabajadores Cesados, supra note 11, ¶ 81.
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The Inter-American Court has always applied direct attribution
of state responsibility in cases of SOEs. The Inter-American
Commission has used the same criterion, but as shown above,
recently and it would seem confusingly, added a reference to
Principle 4 of the UN Guiding Principles, without clarifying the
relation of its content to the American Convention; there might,
therefore, arise a contradiction to the hypothesis of direct
attribution, at least if Guiding Principle 4 is interpreted according to
the Working Group’s reading: in that case, the obligation would
consist only of “leading by example” and not the human rights
obligations a State owes through its bodies and institutions (see also
above, section 2.2).129 It would be important that once presented
with the opportunity to do so, the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights or the Commission could clarify the hypotheses of attribution
they recur to in case of SOEs. This would allow to differentiate
responsibility by SOEs—with their respective thresholds, and
different obligations regarding the obligation to guarantee of human
rights—from responsibility by State oversight organs. What is
valuable from the perspective of access to justice, nevertheless, is the
preoccupation that State ownership must not limit access to justice.
In that sense, the Court and Commission are consistent in simply
assuming that state-ownership may never lead to a reduced level of
attribution or responsibility. What sounds legally surprising in
comparison the remainder of international jurisprudence on SOEs,
addresses, in fact, a major concern: the risk of impunity.
4.

SPECIFIC CHALLENGES

Victims should have an effective remedy even if the act or
omission of an SOE were not attributable to the State, just as they
have the right to an effective remedy regarding private business. But
they might find themselves encountering problems that domestic
law cannot easily solve. For example, the SOE might not be solvent
to pay out compensation under domestic law. In such a situation,
access to justice is ineffective unless the victim can access
compensation paid by the State, i.e., the principal or “parent” of the
SOE. In that sense, when discussing state responsibility, and the
separate entity character of SOEs, the question arises whether there
are situations that are “left out” by the current theory of attribution,
129

UN Working Group, supra note 73, ¶ 28, 45, 46.
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but nevertheless, under international human rights law, require
providing access to justice. A typical case would be that a victim
obtains a favorable judgment that protects his or her rights, but finds
that the SOE is unable to pay out compensation due to lack of
liquidity.
In arbitration law, Badia has made a similar argument. He
considers that the Draft Articles have left loopholes of accountability
that need to be closed by referring to theories of piercing the
corporate veil (section 4.1). In human rights law, there are two issues
that could generate, among others, such loopholes: the initial design
of a SOE,130 and the impact of old contamination sites, left
unattended by the SOE or the State.131 The two examples seem to
have little in common; however, the legal structure accompanying
them shows what they have in common.
4.1 Responsibility for human rights violations caused by the initial
design of SOEs
Certainly, the establishment of a SOE is not in itself an
internationally wrongful act. However, the design of a SOE,
responsibility of governmental organs that clearly fall under Draft
Article 4, can have consequences which make human rights
compliance by that same SOE impossible. Such situations could
arise when the corporate structure is created in order to avoid
transparency on issues which clearly correspond to public functions;
on corruption; campaign financing; environmental protection or
respect of privacy in health services. Most frequently, however, the
design of SOE mirrors the design of subsidiaries which are deprived
almost immediately of the revenues they have generated in order to
avoid pay-out in case of suits. This does not only affect competitors
who have a founded claim against a subsidiary or a SOE, but also
vitiates the claim of individuals or communities who are owed
compensation for human rights violations found by courts.

130
For a consideration of this argument in jurisprudence, see Dimitar
Yordanov v. Bulgaria, ECHR App. No. 3401/09 ¶60 (2018).
131 See generally Wolf Richter, Ökologische Altlasten und Sanierungen im
Treuhandnachfolgebereich, STAATSEIGENTUM. LEGITIMATION UND GRENZEN 319 (Otto
Depenheuer & Bruno Kahl, eds., 2014) (analyzing how the reunified German State
implemented functions of environmental clean-up through state-owned
enterprises).
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Badia has proposed that in international arbitration, the theory
of piercing the corporate veil should apply in order to cover cases
where no state responsibility arises according to the Draft Articles.
This can be the case, for example, if initial under-funding of the SOE
can be proven, and leads to the failure of debt-serving, then the state
as a principal could be made responsible.132 In that sense, he argues
that “when a state is behind [a SOE], the veil should be pierced if
justice so requests.”133 To our knowledge, the theory has not been
applied by international tribunals yet, but was received positively
by some other scholars of international economic law.134
As Badia does not refer to international human rights law and
its specific jurisprudence on SOEs, this section will examine to what
extent a theory of piercing the veil—taken from corporate law, and
considered a general principle of international law by Badia135—
would effectively improve access to justice for (potential) victims of
human rights violations committed by SOEs. It should be clarified
that in civil law jurisdictions, principles of good faith and abuse of
rights often fulfill the same purpose as the theory of piercing the
veil.136
Victims of human rights violations defined in the universal and
regional human rights treaties should not remain without a
remedy.137 In that sense, it is possible to draw a parallel to corporate
law where in certain situations, the parent company is considered
liable for its subsidiary’s torts or crimes. Arguably, there are three
situations that are of special interest: first, the structural set-up of the
SOE, its capitalization and rules on skimming profits. In particular,
it has to be asked whether a mechanism has been set up in order to
See BADIA, supra note 21, at 198.
See BADIA, supra note 21, at 201.
134 See Michael Feit, Book Review of Piercing the Veil of State Enterprises in
International Arbitration, by Albert Badia, 30 ICSID REV. 268, 273 (2015) (praising
Badia for his work and noting that the piercing the veil doctrine has become a
necessary part of holding SOEs accountable for their actions).
135 See generally Katherine Lyons, Piercing the Corporate Veil in the International
Arena, 33 Syracuse J. Int’l. L. & Com. 523 (2006).
136 See José María Lezcano, Piercing the Corporate Veil in Latin American
Jurisprudence, Routledge (2016), at 21–48 (discussing the English theory of corporate
personality in comparison with civil law models, and treatment of damage to
health). See generally Joseph Mauricio Bello, An Overview of the Doctrine of the Piercing
of the Corporate Veil as applied by Latin American Countries: A US Legal Creation exported
to civil law jurisdictions, 14 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 615 (2008) (discussing the
application of piercing the corporate veil in Latin America, and specifically in
Mexico, Argentina, and Venezuela).
137 See generally Leader & Ong, supra note 2.
132
133

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019

930

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 40:4

pay out compensation to human rights victims, including a
definition on which place they take in the cascade of obligations;138
or whether and how funds have been set aside for clean-up after
closure. Badia observed that initial underfunding should be
considered fraudulent.139 Piercing through to the state should also
be possible if privatization was achieved with clauses that aim at
avoiding responsibility.
Second, the corporate veil should be lifted when a state organ
does not authorize the corresponding funds for taking necessary
preventive measures with regards to human rights or the
environment. In those cases, direct state responsibility would arise
due to the acts or omissions of the regulatory organ, for example,
Congress or the Ministry of Finance.140 Although these are primary
obligations under international environmental law, they often
cannot be enforced, and a residual argument of piercing the
corporate veil might be considered, in case access to justice cannot
otherwise be guaranteed, or as Badia has it, if “justice so requires.”
Third, according to Badia, the state should be made liable when
it knew or should have known—as owner—of certain practices or
violations that occur in the SOE. This due diligence argument
depends, ultimately, on the degree of control that the parent (the
state) has over the enterprise. However, it seems that all of these
criteria would also lead to attribution under the law of state
responsibility as it was presented in section 2. The gap that a theory
of piercing the veil could cover is essentially the same that
international human rights law has already filled through
interpreting the notions of “control” and “public or governmental
authority” in the sense the ECtHR has done.
Thus, in relation to the first and second situations, a state is
responsible for setting up a SOE under conditions that avoid liability
in matters of human rights. As the design of a SOE is elaborated by
state organs that fall under Article 4 Draft Articles, attribution of
such acts is not controversial in international law, and if they result
in human rights violations, the State will be responsible under the
treaties that were in force at the time of setting up a SOE. As ECtHR

138 See Rasmiya Kazimova, Insurance as a Risk Management Tool: A Mitigating or
Aggravating Factor?, in Leader & Ong, supra note 2, at 239.
139
BADIA, supra note 21, at 95–98.
140
The regulatory creation of industry-wide general compensation funds is
another option, but it cannot be discussed here.
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jurisprudence shows, the State is also responsible for continuous
violations that ensue from set-up faults.141
In relation to preventive measures, it would be extremely
difficult in most jurisdictions to argue in favor of piercing the veil,
although the argument is very similar to the unavailability of funds
for reparation. The reason seems to be that the obligation of
prevention is very difficult to enforce. Under international law,
however, preventive measures have become part and parcel of the
obligation to guarantee human rights standards to inhabitants,
communities, and individuals affected by business.142 In that sense,
it seems that attribution of responsibility, through the finance organs
that do not authorize the respective budgetary measures, is the
easiest and more accepted way of solving this type of problem.
In the third situation, the decision in Heinisch reported above
refers to this issue of assuming that governmental organs should be
more interested in and can be better informed about what is
happening in relation to SOEs over which they have oversight or
which they (partly) control. While the ECtHR has been reluctant to
reiterate its rationale from Heinisch, the IACtHR has consistently and
automatically assumed knowledge in all cases related to SOEs it has
decided. One question remains pending in this research: Is it a
reason to pierce the veil if the lack of funding for clean-ups or
environmental measures is due to mismanagement or corruption in
the SOE? Does the state have any vicarious liability in such a
situation?143 Considering the principle of effet util, and the access to
an effective remedy, it seems that the answer would have to be in
the affirmative. Research on corruption and human rights has
repeatedly shown how this crime prejudices human rights
protection or places it at risk.144

Fadeyeva, supra note 85.
See generally Ebert & Sijnienski, supra note 22 (discussing the application of
the Osman test).
143 See generally PAULA GILIKER, VICARIOUS LIABILITY IN TORT (2010).
144 See generally Anne Peters, Corruption as a Violation of International Human
Rights, 18 MPIL Research Paper (2016), www.mpil.de [https://perma.cc/GQ3B9HZ7] (linking corruption and a hostility towards human rights in corrupt and
crime ridden countries). For a critical argument, see generally Cecily Rose, The
Limitations of a Human Rights Approach to Corruption, 65 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 405
(2016).
141
142
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4.2 Past damage at contaminated sites and state responsibility
Another specific problem about access to justice in SOE cases
needs to be mentioned separately. It is related to historical
circumstances, but entails important legal consequences. Stateowned enterprises have often started high-impact business in the
extractive or energy sectors, when environmental standards were
still low or non-existent. Contaminated sites, which tend to generate
long-lasting environmental or health-related damage, remain
beyond closure of a site, liquidation of the enterprise, insolvency or
privatization of SOEs, and continues to risk violating human rights
or causing damage. In domestic law, unless there is specific
regulation, or a legal or common law disposition regarding
continuous harmful effects of licit or illicit acts,145 there is usually no
general remedy available, due to statutes of limitations. Piercing the
veil, however, would not solve that problem.
In such cases, attribution under international law might be the
only way of accessing a remedy, as international law does recognize
continuous illicit acts—according to Articles 14 and 15 of the Draft
Articles of 2001—and does not impose statutory limitations. If the
damage had been initially caused by a SOE, it would be the state that
would be accountable for the continuous consequences of that
pollution. Peru implicitly acknowledged such a situation when
carrying out the clean-up for the contamination at La Oroya (see
section 3.2). International law, however, does not contain explicit or
specific rules on old contaminated sites,146 which would have been
created before the enforcement of international treaties. Therefore,
attribution of continuous violations would be possible if State
control over the SOE fulfilled the criteria set out in section 2.1, at the
time of contamination, or afterwards when damage could have been
mitigated or cleaned up. If this were not the case, attribution is only
possible for lack of due diligence by oversight organs or other state
organs, either under human rights treaties or under customary
international law.147 In those cases, only indirect responsibility
145 See Richter, supra note 131 (discussing the specific case of ecological cleanup through SOEs in Eastern Germany after re-unification).
146 See generally Anastasia Telesetsky, An Cliquet & Afshin Akhtar-Khavari,
Ecological Restoration in International Environmental Law, Routledge (2016) (detailing
the “soft” legal régime that ecological restoration lives under in the international
law context, the regional law context, and the individual law context).
147 See generally JOANNA KULESZA, DUE DILIGENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2016).
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would arise, by virtue of the horizontal state obligation to protect,
pursuant to, for one example, Article 1.1 of the American
Convention on Human Rights.
5.

CONCLUSION: SUMMARY OF CRITERIA FOR ATTRIBUTION OF SOE
ACTS AND OMISSIONS TO THE STATE

This paper discussed to what extent acts and omissions of SOEs
in matters of human rights must be attributed to the state. Under
current general international law, jurisprudence and literature seem
to exclude the possibility of attributing responsibility for SOE acts
and omissions unless they are related to governmental authority, or,
arguably, a sufficiently close control over the SOE by the state. Thus,
any purely commercial activity, and human rights violations
committed in their pursuit, would not be directly attributable.
Rather, for those cases, there seems to be a consensus in international
human rights law that if the regulatory or supervisory organs had not
acted diligently or acted in any other way contrary to the state’s
international human rights obligations, responsibility arises for that
organs’ acts and omissions. Also, state responsibility accrues for the
lack of access to justice rather than for the initial act carried out by
the SOE.
The criteria that indicate direct state responsibility for SOEs, to
the contrary, have been developed in arbitration jurisprudence, and
more specifically, in the European Court of Human Rights. The
Inter-American System has not developed criteria for distinguishing
cases of attribution from others; rather, it has dealt with all SOEs as
if they were state organs. This is justifiable due to the close control
of government over the SOE, or its governmental (usually
regulatory) function. However, it would be useful if the IAS bodies
would clarify their criteria for attributing acts and omissions of SOEs
to a state.
The criteria of direct attribution that have been found in
international human rights law—explicitly or implicitly—can be
summarized as follows:
a. Public function or governmental authority
Regulatory or governmental function
Administrative law or special legal schemes applicable,
instead of insolvency law or general corporate law
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Jurisdiction of administrative courts, rather than ordinary

The nature of the SOE’s activity is public, i.e. refers to
provision of public services (only in IHRL)
Monopoly position
b. State control over the company
Nomination and withdrawal of leading executives and
board members
Ministerial participation in boards, especially with specific
voting rights
Veto provisions or decision-making prerogatives for state
organs, regarding certain decisions, especially, budgetary
assignations
Jurisdiction of administrative courts, rather than ordinary
courts
The SOE has specific accountability or reporting obligations
towards the State
The SOE is identified as a governmental organ in publicity,
internet presence, and especially, discourse by leading executives
c. Additional indicators: procedural consistency
State has invoked immunity for the SOE, in this or other
proceedings
Coherence of procedural facts, for example, representation
by governmental organs in domestic or international disputes
These criteria need to be assessed globally for ‘control’ and
‘public function and governmental authority’; this means that not all
of these elements have to be fulfilled in order to find in favor of
attribution. Rather, all facts are taken together to see whether the
SOE carries out governmental functions, and/or is closely
controlled by state organs, respectively. As was shown, there are
additionally some soft-law standards such as the UN Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights, which do not relate to
any definition on attribution. Rather, they define a manner to
proceed with minimum requirements, which do not comply with
international human rights law.
Regarding the proposal to use theories of piercing the corporate
veil regarding SOEs, in cases where the Draft Articles leave doubt
about effective state responsibility, this paper has argued that all
situations that such a legal device could cover, are encompassed by
international human rights jurisprudence already: No specific
situation could be detected where the theory of piercing the
corporate veil, understood as a principle of international law, would
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actually suggest responsibility, while attribution rules for human
rights cases would not. Rather, all situations that Badia identified as
problematic, can be subsumed under the attribution rules identified
in this article. The main systematic reason for this conclusion is the
fact that both corporate veil theories and attribution theories are
based on the examination of the control of the SOE by the State (the
“parent”). Additionally, public service hypotheses, recognized in
international human rights law as a basis for attribution, cannot be
accounted for by corporate veil theories. Furthermore, one of the
difficult cases from a human rights perspective—the case of
historically contaminated sites abandoned or created by SOEs—
cannot be solved by piercing the veil, but only by attributing state
responsibility for continuous violations.
As this article has shown, there are several strong arguments for
attributions of actions and omissions by SOEs in matters of human
rights to the state itself, especially if the SOE carries out
governmental functions, are significantly controlled by the State, or
might avoid paying out compensation through early
reincorporation of revenues to the state budget. Jurisprudence in
several human rights bodies shows that SOEs must be considered
the first business entities that under international law, have direct
responsibilities. Of course, this responsibility is “mediated”
through the state to which SOE actions and omissions are
attributable, but regional courts and UN committees have found
that a state cannot sever itself from its human rights obligations by
creating a SOE. Future research and legal argument has to show
whether these arguments are equally applicable to different rights,
or whether they are rights-specific, just like positive obligations, due
diligence obligations and obligations of progressive realization. In
order to decide on state responsibility in concrete cases, and once
attribution issues are solved, it is necessary to assess the scope and
content of human rights obligations owed by a SOE. In that sense,
SOEs are the only business entities which can be seen, as of now, to
have direct responsibility under international law lege lata.
Furthermore, it seems to be clear that a state should not consider
its due diligence obligations exhausted when determining that a
SOE is not solvent to pay out compensation, if this lack of funds is
due to initial underfunding, or to the excessive incorporation of
utilities into the state budget. By the same token, the state cannot
avoid responsibility—in this case, responsibility of state organs
under Article 4 of the Draft Articles—when failing to assign
additional funds to human rights protection. The same is true for

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019

936

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 40:4

failure to provide access to justice in SOE cases. Finally, if a state
chooses to comply with its obligations to guarantee and provide
services, which are considered fulfillment of rights, through SOEs,
the jurisprudence of various human rights bodies coalesces around
the assertion that state responsibility should not be limited, in
comparison with a state that chooses to provide those services
through public services or private entities.
Of course, solving specific SOE problems does not solve access
to justice problems for those cases in which it is accepted that a SOE
acts as private business. In those cases, an alleged victim of human
rights violations encounters the challenges of, for example, third
party standing, the definition of human rights in domestic
constitutional or legal provisions, or issues of extraterritorial
liabilities.
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